INTRODUCTION
The international monetary system (IMS) operates in a more complex world economy than in the past. On the one hand, international transactions occur in more open and efficient markets and large monetary unions interact with flexible exchange rates.
Furthermore, a significant number of European national currencies has been replaced by the euro, thus eliminating the risk of crises among legacy-currency countries. Finally, the process of industrialization has become more diffused in the world, as a result of globalization and the decentralization of international investment. On the other hand, the IMS architecture appears incapable of delivering external balances and facilitating smooth adjustments when imbalances are large and persistent. External imbalances last for two main reasons. The first is that their financing is made easier by the liberalized capital movements. The second is that exchange rate changes are not big enough to restore equilibrium in the current account. There is a convergence of interests for maintaining misaligned exchange rates and external imbalances. The equilibrium holds because the United States is keen in preserving the benefits of the key-currency and creditor countries are keen in accumulating US assets and avoiding capital losses on their rising dollar balances. This equilibrium, resulting from the convergence of interest of the two counterparties, is supported by the practice of surplus countries of sterilizing increases in the foreign component of the monetary base. The critical question is how long can such equilibrium last.
At this stage of the IMS, there are (at least) two strategies. The first one is a conservative strategy, aimed at maintaining the status quo. The underlying assumption, supported by many economists and historians, is that the IMS, to work well, must be centered on a key-currency issued by a dominant country with a deep financial market and a range of short-term instruments accessible by non-residents; see Kindleberger (1973) and Eichengreen (1989) among others. The trouble with the conservative strategy is that there is no coherent plan on either stopping the deteriorating dollar standard or of accelerating the replacement of the dollar by another key currency. The euro is the natural candidate, but financial and more importantly political integration in Euroland is still incomplete.
The second strategy is a proactive one. This strategy is based on two pillars. The first is that there is an alternative to the hegemonic solution in the form of a cooperative decision-making process (Fratianni and von Hagen, 1992, Ch. 3 ). The second is that a progressive reduction of the dual role of the dollar as a national and international currency can be obtained by introducing a supranational money, albeit gradually. Keynes Plan fits in this category. The Plan has been a recurrent theme of the literature.
1 It remains timely because the fundamental causes of the instability of the IMS are as valid today as they were in the early Forties. 2 From the crisis of the gold-dollar standard to the ongoing international financial crisis events have confirmed the vulnerability of the current IMS and have made the reform of the system more urgent and, at the same time, more feasible along the lines of Keynes' principles. Bancor, Keynes' supranational currency, lost to the dollar at Bretton Woods, not because of any intellectual inferiority, but because the United States was the dominant power and the largest net creditor of the war-ravaged rest of the world. Yet, some of the ideas of the Keynes Plan resurface among U.S. policy makers whenever the dollar is under strain; in those instances the United States seeks cooperative solutions to get out of the impasse (James 1996, Ch. 13) . The severity of the subprime crisis, having exposed the financial vulnerability of the center country, may 1 Reform plans inspired to Keynes Plan include those authored by Triffin, Bernstein, Day, among others; see Grubel (1963) , Machlup (1966) and Horsefield (1969) . 2 On the lasting relevance of Keynes' ideas on international monetary policy, see Alessandrini (1977) . On the feasibility of Keynes Plan to solve current fundamental imbalances, see also Costabile (2006) and Rossi (2007) .
accelerate the process of de-dollarization in the IMS and enhance the incentives of the United States to seek an international accord of the type we envision in this paper. 
THE CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY
From Bretton Woods to the dollar standard Bretton Woods broke down because the center country, the United States, was unwilling to provide a stable inflation rate to the system. The center country abused the privileges emanating from its national currency functioning also as the key international currency.
U.S. monetary authorities, when faced with stark choices between domestic and international objectives, placed the former above the latter. Triffin (1960) France was a particularly recalcitrant player in objecting to the "exorbitant privilege" that the United States enjoyed as a result of having an international currency.
The corollary of the "exorbitant privilege" principle was that the United States could embark on expansionist policies without suffering balance-of-payments crises to which all other countries were instead subject. The guns-and-butter policies of the United States in the 1960s were a prime example of this soft budget constraint.
While Bretton Woods is long gone, the United States still enjoys the benefits of a key currency. For almost half a century, foreign central banks financing has accounted, on average, for approximately 6.5 per cent of total US imports, but have been higher when the dollar has been weak against major currencies and lower when the dollar has been strong; see The end result is that the United States is financing its Federal debt at a lower cost than if its currency were simply a domestic currency. The "interest rate subsidy," in turn,
gives the U.S. government an incentive to either expand expenditures for given tax rates or reduce tax rates for given expenditures. U.S. budget deficits rise. Unless the private sector offsets the higher government dissaving with higher net saving, the country as a whole will experience a decline in saving over investment and, consequently, a rise in the current-account deficit. Thus, in the absence of Ricardian equivalence, the interest rate subsidy implies higher current-account deficits and larger foreign debt.
The issuer of an international currency bears costs as well, connected with the commitment to supply the "international stability" public good. These costs arise from the provision of a stable purchasing power of the currency and the constraints placed on the central bank to achieve such stability. In particular, exchange rate stability must be more important than objectives of high employment and output stabilization. If domestic objectives instead prevail, the reserve currency country abuses its privileges and deviates from the long-run solution. The United States, ultimately, found the costs of being a reserve currency country, under a regime of exchange rate stability, too large relative to the benefits of having a key currency. It produced an inflation rate that was neither consistent with the fixed dollar-gold conversion price nor with the preferences of major players like Germany.
The new benign neglect approach
The term "benign neglect" has been used to describe the policy of indifference of U.S.
policy makers with regard to U.S. The resulting ex-ante gap between saving and investment is responsible for currentaccount surpluses in the emerging countries and falling real rates of interest in the world.
The industrial world, but primarily the United States, has absorbed the capital inflows generated by Asia and oil-producing countries. Once the shock peters out -and this is bound to happen with rising consumers' aspirations in fast-growing emerging economies-current account imbalances will return to sustainable levels. In essence, the saving glut hypothesis implies that the large U.S. current account imbalances since the mid Nineties are a temporary and self-correcting phenomenon. It follows that "purely inward-looking policies are unlikely to resolve this issue" (Bernanke 2005 , p. 9).
Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2006) Sturzenegger, conclude that "plausible estimates for U.S. intangible capital imply only a small reduction in U.S. net external liabilities" (p. 11). A related argument is that the under-measured U.S. foreign assets earn a higher rate of return than the U.S. pays on its foreign liabilities. Back in the Sixties, Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant (1966) argued the thesis that the United States was the banker of the world, transforming short-term borrowing into illiquid and long-term lending. Gourinchas and Rey (2005) extend the banker-of-the-world thesis into a leveraged financial intermediary hypothesis. Now, the United States is issuing not only short-term liabilities but also fixed income liabilities that are leveraged to effect investments abroad in the form of illiquid foreign direct investments and equities. The excess return on U.S. assets over U.S. liabilities reflects the "exorbitant privilege" the United States earns because of its special role in the international monetary system.
How long can it last?
The critical question to raise about the new benign neglect view is: How long can U.S.
external deficits and dollar supremacy last? Dooley et al. conclude that the system can continue as it is for quite some time. After the onset of the subprime crisis, Bernanke (2007) has written a follow-up to the cited 2005 piece, in which he restates the implications of the saving glut hypothesis and reaffirms "the attractiveness of both the U.S. economy overall and the depth, liquidity, and legal safeguards associated with its capital markets" (p.6). Yet, soon after, he warns that "the large U.S. current account deficit cannot persist indefinitely because the ability of the United States to make debt service payments and the willingness of foreigners to hold U.S. assets in their portfolio are both limited" (p. 7). Bernanke also emphasizes that the rebalances of external imbalances will also require some degree of burden sharing between surplus and deficit countries. However, he is more guarded about the prospect of a gradual and orderly absorption of external imbalances: "signs of progress have appeared but... most countries have only begun to undertake the policy changes that will ultimately be needed" (pp. 7-8). Roubini and Setser (2005) believe that the system has a high risk of unraveling soon. 8 Among the reasons for a quick end, these authors mention the distortions arising in the United States from excessive consumption and employment in interest-sensitive sectors, an over supply of non-tradable and an under supply of tradable goods, the difficulty of sterilizing large purchases of dollar assets by China so as to keep inflation under control, and the rising risk of capital losses on dollar reserves.
Eichengreen (2004) also deems the system unstable for a variety of reasons but the most important being the following three. The first is that the new periphery is less cohesive and less homogenous than the old Bretton Woods periphery. The Asian countries do not share the historical background and institution building of post-war Europe and are less inclined to create suitable collective-action mechanisms aimed at preserving the current system. Bretton Woods, in full operation, lasted a little more than a decade, from 1958 to 1971. The new Bretton Woods is likely to break down sooner. The second is that, today, the world has in the euro an attractive alternative to the dollar, whereas under Bretton Woods the alternative to the dollar was a moribund pound. The exit of a dollar standard is less costly today than in the sixties. The third is the weaker commitment of the center country to preserve the value of its liabilities. Under Bretton Woods the United States was committed to convert dollars into gold at a fixed price; no such commitment exists today. In fact, US policies can be best characterized as benign neglect with respect to the exchange rate and external deficits.
The most pessimists about the unsustainability of the U.S. external imbalances are
Obstfeld and Rogoff, who in a series of papers predict a large and disruptive depreciation of the dollar. 9 Frankel (2006) , in his comments to Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006) , aligns himself with the hard-landing scenario and warns that the U.S.
"dependence on foreign central banks may eventually bring about a loss of US global hegemony" (p. 3).
A PROACTIVE STRATEGY
While it is difficult to predict the timing of a crisis, the risk is rising that the fragile equilibrium of the IMS can collapse as a result of a shock in the U.S. financial markets, such as the recent subprime crisis, or of a geo-political shock. The shock could work its way through by sparking a confidence crisis in the dollar as a reserve currency that would instigate, in turn, large sales of foreign owned dollar-denominated assets, sharp realignments of exchange rates and either a curtailment of capital inflows to the United
States or a sharp rise in its cost of foreign borrowing. Either way, the center country would have to quickly realign domestic consumption with domestic production with adverse consequences on economic growth at home and abroad. The policy reactions to the shock could be further complicated by anti-globalization sentiments and a resurgence of protectionism. In sum, the existing equilibrium aimed by the conservative strategy may be precarious and has the potential to unleash a world recession.
At the root of the problem is the absence of a stable international money that can fulfil the traditional functions of money and also guarantee symmetric, yet smooth, adjustments by surplus and deficit countries alike. The gold-exchange standard, chosen at Bretton Woods, accepted a second best compromise by electing the national currency of the dominant country to become the reserve currency of the system, albeit with a gold convertibility clause. As we have seen in the previous section, the asymmetry deriving from the dual role of the dollar as both a national and international currency proved to be unstable in the long run. The ensuing dollar standard has been more asymmetric than the gold-dollar system: the center country has continued to operate with an even softer external constraint and has gained the added benefit of having been released from the gold convertibility obligation.
Keynesian principles
The alternative proactive strategy envisions a gradual introduction of a supranational money to reduce the asymmetries of the key-currency system. This strategy rests on five fundamental principles of the Keynes Plan: gradualism, the banking approach, complementarity, multilateralism, and symmetry of adjustment.
By gradualism Keynes meant flexibility in accepting lower degrees of "supernational management" so long as improvements were envisioned in the future towards the ultimate goal. G icu + ∑OD = ∑ bancor, 10 As a case in point, Keynes redrafted the Plan five times to make it more politically acceptable The first draft was dated September 8, 1941; the last one, which we refer as Keynes (1943) , was issued by the British Government as a White Paper in April, 1943; see Horsefield (1969) and Moggridge (1980). where ∑ sums over the n participating central banks. We have expressed (1) in terms of the ith currency by defining one bancor equal to one unit of gold and the spot exchange rate between the ith currency and bancor also being equal to one.
Whereas the creation of bancors through transfers of gold to the ICU does not alter the stock of monetary base in the world, their creation through the overdraft facility does.
The ICU activates OD when a deficit country has depleted its initial stock of bancors: the deficit country borrows from the ICU and bancors are credited to the surplus country.
This mechanism is the direct outcome of the banking approach adopted by the Keynes Under the Keynesian multilateral principle, all countries are treated symmetrically vis-à-vis the ICU. This applies also to the key-currency country, which loses much of its privilege of financing external deficit with its own currency because reserve assets denominated in the key currency are limited to "working balances for the daily management" in the exchange markets. 12 Creditor-country central banks can exchange bancors for dollar-denominated assets (say US T-bills) at the ICU, which would then charge the bancor account of the Fed. In the end, the creditor-country central bank has more bancors and fewer U.S. T-bills, while the Fed has fewer bancors (or more OD) and a smaller monetary base. Thus, the key currency country faces an external balance constraint related to its bancor position. This is a key result of the Keynes Plan that has not been fully understood. 13 The substitution of bancors for dollar-denominated reserves implies, not only a decline of the monetary base in the United States, but also a fall in the stock of supranational bank money and a hardening of the external constraint. Unless the United States counteracts such a decline, the conversion of dollar assets into international money sets off an adjustment process. It also follows that the the n -1 redundancy 12 "The monetary reserves of a member State, viz., the Central Bank or other bank or Treasury deposits in excess of a working balance, shall not be held in another country except with the approval of the monetary authorities of that country" (Keynes 1943, p. 24) . 13 To clarify with an example, let the ECB be the creditor central bank that wants to replace $100 worth of U.S. T-bills with bancors. The ECB sells the T-bills to Citicorp for $100 dollar deposit. The ECB then instructs Citicorp to transfer the deposit with the Fed, a transaction that implies a decline of $ 100 in U.S. bank reserves and U.S. monetary base, while the Fed's total liabilities remain unchanged. 13 Finally, the ECB instructs the Fed to sell the $100 dollar deposit for an equivalent amount of bancors. At this point, the ICU would credit the ECB with $100 worth of bancors and debit the Fed's bancor account for the same amount.
problem (Mundell 1968, pp. 143-47 and 195-98) 14 In his view, the rules of the game should be managed in the mutual interests of surplus and deficit countries so as to finance external disequilibria in the short run and to allow enough time for the adjustment process. The implication was that sterilization was acceptable in the short run if domestic circumstances warranted and that shared responsibility of adjustment did not necessarily mean contemporaneous adjustment. The sequence and timing of the adjustment was dictated by the need "to offset deflationary or inflationary tendencies in effective world demand" (Keynes 1943, p. 20) . If inflation prevails, the burden of adjustment falls primarily on the deficit country.
If unemployment prevails, it is up to the surplus country to take an expansionary action.
15
14 "The disadvantage is that it hampers each Central Bank in tackling its own national problems, interferes with pioneer improvements of policy (…), and does nothing to secure either the shortperiod or the long-period optimum if the average behaviour is governed by blind forces such as the total quantity of gold" (Keynes 1930, p. 256) . 15 This point on the division of the burden of adjustment was further elaborated by Mundell (1968, ch.13 and Appendix B of ch. 20) .
In the Keynes Plan the size of financing, through the overdraft facility, is constrained by quotas assigned to participating countries. 16 Bancor balances that deviate from the quotas are discouraged. The Plan introduces a penalty interest rate on excessive positive and negative bancor balances. 17 Furthermore, there are quantitative limits that are binding for debtor countries and non-compulsory for creditor countries. The participation of creditor countries in the adjustment process poses the greatest challenge. 18 These countries must be convinced to accept bancors in the short run, but not to hoard them in the long run. Keynes' flexible approach to the rules of game alleviates only partially the danger of hoarding. A managed flexibility cannot be based on the "miracle" of an informal "collective responsibility" to obtain the best compromise between domestic full employment and international stability. In our proposal this weakness is overcome by a "formal" collective responsibility, resulting from a cooperative agreement among a restricted group of key countries that find it in their interest to share responsibility to stabilize the IMS.
A FEASIBLE COOPERATIVE PROPOSAL
Theory and practice suggest that cooperation is more likely the smaller the number of and the more homogeneous are the participating countries. There are some historical precedents of monetary cooperation among the few. In 1936, the United States, the United Kingdom and France signed the Tripartite Agreement that had the objective of exchange rate stability by imposing mutual responsibility on creditor and debtor countries (Horsefield 1969, volume I, p.6-10) . Bretton Woods, while signed by many countries, 16 For Keynes, quotas are calculated as the average of exports and imports of goods and services. In a world of free capital movements, the definition could be extended to include capital flows. 17 "These charges are not absolutely essential to the scheme. But…they would be valuable and important inducements towards keeping a level balance, and a significant indication that the system looks on excessive credit balances with as critical an eye as on excessive debit balances, each being, indeed, the inevitable concomitant of the other" (Keynes 1943, p. 23) . 18 On the difficulties to share the burden of adjustment, see Kindleberger (1979) . The European Payments Union applied the principles of the international clearing union, except the use of a supranational money. It operated from 1950 to 1958 and led to the convertibility of the European currencies; see Yeager (1968, pp. 363-377) and James (1996, pp. 76-77 and 95-99) . 
The New International Clearing Union
For simplicity, we assume that there are three dominant countries in the world: the United States, the Euro area, and China. The dollar and the euro are key currencies and the central banks of these two key-currency countries, the Fed and the ECB, agree to create NICU that issues SBMs backed by dollar and euro domestic assets. The Fed and the ECB are high-reputation central banks commitment to price stability. They would agree to pursue similar inflation rates over the medium term and would transfer a portion of their domestic assets, αD us and βD eu respectively, to NICU and receive in exchange SBM.
SBM, unlike Keynes' bancor, is a currency basket backed by earning assets and has properties that are similar to the SDRs and the European Currency Unit. It is equal to a fixed amount of dollars and euros, q us = αD us and q eu = βD eu, respectively . SBM, like bancor, circulates only among central banks, at least in the first stages, and its value can be expressed in any of the three currencies: NICU operates in the spirit of Keynes' ICU. Again, define balance-of-payments surpluses and deficits in terms of the official settlement concept. As an example, we assume that the Euro area is in balance and that China has a surplus equal to γSBM us ;
China's surplus is the U.S. deficit. The Chinese central bank intervenes in the exchange markets and purchases dollar assets that are exchanged for SBM by drawing down the Fed's account with NICU:
(6) αD us + S $ /є βD eu = (1-γ)SBM us + SBM c + SBM eu , for 0< γ<1.
where SBM c = γ SBM us . The total stock of SBM has remained the same. Part of the Next, assume γ > 1. The United States has an inadequate stock of SBMs to settle its balance-of-payments deficit. As in the Keynes Plan, NICU has the authority to extend a loan, in the form of an overdraft, to the United States. The value of this overdraft is the excess of Chinese intervention with respect to the stock of SBM owned by the United
States, (γ -1)SBM us = OD us . 24 We are assuming in this case that the overdraft falls within the quota; NICU's balance sheet would look like:
(8) αD us + S j /є βD eu + OD us = SBM c + SBM eu , for γ>1.
With the overdraft, the stock of SBM has expanded. This expansion was to be temporary for Keynes; it serves the purpose of giving the deficit country time to adjust. We recall that Keynes insisted that the external adjustment would not come at the expense of internal equilibrium. Thus, the rules of the game can become more complex depending on economic conditions, as shown in section 3. If inflation prevails, the burden of adjustment falls primarily on the deficit country. If unemployment prevails, the burden of adjustment falls primarily on the surplus country. NICU has a hedged position and does not incur in exchange rate losses or gains.
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
Any reform proposal must be judged by the incentives to reform and consequently the likelihood of adoption. There is a broad consensus that the large U.S. current-account deficits financed with foreign capital inflows at low interest rates cannot continue forever;
there is much less consensus on when the system is likely to end and how badly it will end. Over the short run, China is the critical player in bringing about changes. The United
States have no immediate interest in stopping the benefits from excessive consumption financed with low interest rate capital inflows. Over the longer run, however, the United Cooperation is a process. Participating countries need to learn to explore, in a sort of 25 There is also a political risk. The Chinese government has the resources to purchase large U.S. corporations in strategic sectors, such as energy and pharmaceuticals, or with established brand names (e.g., Coca Cola). Governments have different motives than profit-minded private actors; and authoritarian governments behave differently than democratically elected governments. The U.S. government could resist a massive Chinese acquisition of US "industrial jewels." Yet, the question must be raised about the bargaining power of the United States in preventing such acquisitions given that the Chinese are key buyers of the Federal debt. may also argue that in a G-3 Accord, China is a strange bed fellow. Our answer is that it is time to ask China to play an international role commensurate with its economic power.
China, now, is under-represented in international organizations.
Some caution is in order on what could be achieved by a tripartite agreement and NICU. The fragility of the current IMS reflects large external imbalance (flows) and large accumulated dollar reserves (stocks). We have emphasized fixing the flows before fixing the stocks since both cannot be done simultaneously without disrupting the economies. It will take time to reabsorb the overhang of dollars.
Finally, the Keynes Plan has been criticized for its inflationary bias. In our proposal, we minimize this risk by having two high-reputation central banks commit to low and similar inflation rates over the medium term. The recent inflation history of the United
States and the Euro area suggests that such a commitment is feasible. There is also the concern that NICU might be too lenient on the size of the overdrafts and the time period over which these need to be repaid. This risk is reduced by linking overdrafts to quotas that, in turn, are linked to trade and capital flows. The size of commercial and financial transactions would thus constrain the credit function of NICU.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
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